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CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTION: 
RELIGION AND THE ROBERTS 
COURT 
 
Marc O. DeGirolami* 
 
This Article argues that the most salient feature to emerge in the first decade 
of the Roberts Court’s law and religion jurisprudence is the contraction of the 
constitutional law of religious freedom. It illustrates that contraction in three 
ways.  
First, contraction of judicial review. Only once has the Roberts Court 
exercised the power of judicial review to strike down federal, state, or local 
legislation, policies, or practices on the ground that they violate the Free 
Exercise or Establishment Clauses. In this constitutional context the Court has 
been nearly uniformly deferential to government laws and policies. That 
distinguishes it from its two predecessors—the Rehnquist and Burger Courts—
both of which exercised judicial review more regularly.  
Second, contraction in the range of voting patterns. The votes of the Justices 
in law and religion cases overwhelmingly are either unanimous or split five to 
four, with relatively few separate dissents or concurrences expressing distinctive 
approaches, and with the split correlating with partisan political or ideological 
divisions. The “liberal” and “conservative” wings vote in bloc, and frequently 
reason in bloc as well. This again contrasts with the voting patterns of prior 
Courts in religious freedom cases. 
Third, contraction in coverage. As a substantive matter, the Court is 
narrowing the religion clauses. Every member of the Court seems now to accept 
that Employment Division v. Smith properly interpreted the Free Exercise 
Clause. Matters are more complicated for the Establishment Clause, where there 
is far greater division among the Justices. Nevertheless, the Article claims that 
the Court is moving in a variety of ways toward a narrow interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause as well. 
 
 *  Associate Professor, Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship, St. John’s University 
School of Law. I am grateful to Pasquale Annicchino, John Barrett, Thomas Berg, Samuel 
Bray, Frederick Gedicks, Paul Horwitz, John Inazu, Randy Kozel, Anita Krishnakumar, 
Christopher Lund, Mark Movsesian, Michael Perino, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Marco Ventura, 
Kevin Walsh, and Adam White, as well to Karlo Dizon and the staff of the Stanford Law & 
Policy Review, for comments, direction, and discussion. Thanks also to John Boersma for 
research assistance. This Article benefited from a presentation at a conference organized by 
the European University Institute. 
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Whether the Roberts Court’s contraction of the religion clauses, and its 
general preference for narrow readings of both, are positive developments will 
depend on one’s views about fundamental questions of constitutional 
interpretation. Yet there is a conceptual unity to the Court’s approach—logical 
and complementary, even if not inevitable; just as the Rehnquist Court narrowed 
the scope of constitutional protection for free exercise, so, too, is the Roberts 
Court narrowing the scope of constitutional prohibition under the Establishment 
Clause. In this corner of constitutional law, the Court is gradually withdrawing 
from the scene.  
INTRODUCTION 
Though John G. Roberts has been Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court for only just more than nine years—less than the median tenure 
of eleven years for a Chief Justice1—the time is ripe for an initial assessment of 
the Court’s contributions to the law of religious freedom under his stewardship. 
Since the fall of 2005,2 the Supreme Court has issued decisions or substantive 
orders in four cases directly3 involving the religion clauses of the Constitution,4 
two cases primarily about the Speech Clause and indirectly involving the 
religion clauses,5 three cases involving the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act,6 and one case involving the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA).7 It has also declined to hear several cases about 
establishment and free exercise (occasionally accompanied by illuminating 
dissents from, or “statements” about, denial of certiorari), and these, too, 
suggest something about its general approach to this corner of the First 
 
 1.  Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Court in History? The Roberts Court and 
the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2219, 2226 n.45 (2014) 
(“Roberts’s tenure is comparable, for example, to that of Salmon Chase or William Howard 
Taft.”).  
 2.  The Senate confirmed Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court on September 
29, 2005.  
 3.  The religion clauses are implicated in different ways in these cases. For example, 
some involve standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim only, while others concern the 
substance of the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, a case that “directly” involves the 
religion clauses is centrally about the meaning of those clauses, while a case that “indirectly” 
concerns the clauses does not address their meaning. 
 4.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. 
v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 
(2007). An additional case, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010), involved the 
Establishment Clause but was decided on other grounds, though several concurring and 
dissenting opinions raised the Establishment Clause issues. 
 5.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 6.  Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 7.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); cf. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 
(2011) (involving RLUIPA only indirectly). 
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Amendment.8 So there are more than a few cases and a smattering of other data 
to peruse, reflect upon, and study. While there is inevitably something artificial 
about carving up the Court’s jurisprudence by the tenure of a Chief Justice,9 
several interesting institutional and substantive patterns have already begun to 
emerge. 
This Article argues that the most salient feature of the Roberts Court’s first 
decade of jurisprudence on the religion clauses is its contraction of the 
constitutional law of religious freedom. It illustrates that contraction in three 
ways.  
First, contraction of judicial review. Only once has the Roberts Court 
exercised the power of judicial review to strike down federal, state, and local 
legislation, policies, or practices on the ground that they violate the Free 
Exercise or Establishment Clauses.10 In this constitutional context the Court 
has been nearly uniformly deferential to government laws and policies.11 That 
distinguishes it from its two predecessors—the Rehnquist and Burger Courts—
both of which exercised judicial review of federal, state, and local legislation 
and administrative practices more regularly. The Roberts Court’s constitutional 
deference also largely contrasts with its statutory law and religion 
jurisprudence, where it has been more likely to rule against the government. 
Part I of the Article considers several possible explanations for this judicial-
review asceticism.12 
Second, contraction in the range of voting patterns in law and religion 
cases, or at least in the desire of the Justices to express their views in individual 
opinions. The votes of the Justices in law and religion cases reflect a recurring 
and yet rather unusual pattern: overwhelmingly the cases are either unanimous 
or split five to four, with comparatively few separate dissents expressing 
distinctive approaches, and with the split correlating with (if not due to) 
partisan political or ideological divisions. If the “liberal” wing of the Court 
 
 8.  For further discussion, see infra Part I. 
 9.  There are many other ways to analyze developments in the Court’s jurisprudence 
with reference to its internal dynamics. But the tenure of Chief Justices—indeed, the very 
fact that Supreme Court epochs are often conceived as somehow corresponding to the Chief 
Justice (the Warren Court, the Burger Court, and so on)—is one common and useful way of 
doing so.  
 10.  I define judicial review in the conventional way: as the Court’s exercise of its 
constitutional power to strike down federal, state, or local laws, policies, or practices.  
 11.  Even in those cases where the Court has limited the reach of federal law, its 
approach has been deferential. For further discussion, see infra Part I. 
 12.  This Article focuses solely on these doctrinal developments; it is, in this sense, 
Supreme Court-centric, and its underlying assumption is that the doctrinal changes studied 
here aid in understanding the trajectory of the Court’s jurisprudence. Nevertheless, and 
without injury to that project, any complete explanation for the types of constitutional 
contraction explored here would also need to account for political and cultural factors (the 
composition of the Court, the ebb and flow of the culture wars, and many others) beyond the 
scope of this Article. For one persuasive “political” study of this kind, see generally John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 279 (2001). 
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joins its “conservative” counterpart, it almost always does so in a bloc rather 
than piecemeal. The contrasts with the voting patterns of prior Courts in 
religious freedom cases and the possible reasons for this bivalent distributional 
voting pattern are explored in Part II of this Article.  
Third, contraction in the coverage of the religion clauses. As a substantive 
matter, the Court is narrowing the religion clauses. It has done little to indicate 
that it will depart from its free exercise holding in Employment Division v. 
Smith.13 Indeed, with one possible exception,14 every member of the Court 
seems now to accept that Smith properly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause. 
Matters are more complicated for the Establishment Clause, where there is far 
greater division among the Justices about fundamental questions of 
interpretation and scope. Nevertheless, using a simple but effective four-part 
interpretive scheme—narrow free exercise, broad free exercise, narrow 
establishment, and broad establishment—the Article argues in Part III that the 
Court is moving steadily toward narrow interpretations of both clauses.  
Of the three varieties of contraction, the last is the most speculative. Any 
complete explanation for the progressive contraction of the religion clauses is, 
at this point, premature. The Roberts Court has not yet decided enough religion 
clause cases to make a definitive statement about the trajectory of its 
jurisprudence. And, of course, significant changes in the composition of the 
Roberts Court may in turn reverse or otherwise modify any of these contracting 
tendencies. Nevertheless, without taking a hard position on the merits of 
constitutional contraction, this Article offers several explanations for the 
religion clauses’ contraction in coverage. There is, in fact, a conceptual unity to 
the Court’s approach, logical even if not inevitable: just as the Rehnquist Court 
narrowed the scope of free exercise in the Smith decision, the Roberts Court is 
gradually cutting away some of the doctrinal fat that has bloated the 
Establishment Clause over the past several decades.15  
I.   CONTRACTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Roberts Court’s asceticism with respect to judicial review is in part a 
function of the cases that it has agreed and declined to hear, and in part of how 
it has disposed of the cases that it has heard: discretionary review makes it 
necessary to consider both categories of cases. Yet by either measure, the 
Roberts Court has eaten an extremely lean diet. It has agreed to hear fewer 
constitutional challenges implicating the religion clauses than its predecessors: 
counting generously, it has heard seven such cases, while over a comparable 
 
 13.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 14.  The possible exception is Justice Alito. For elaboration, see infra Part III. 
 15.  See Marc O. DeGirolami, Bloating the Establishment Clause, CTR. FOR L. & 
RELIGION FORUM (May 16, 2012), http://clrforum.org/2012/05/16/bloating-the-
establishment-clause (arguing that the Court’s current Establishment Clause tests—and the 
endorsement test especially—are highly conducive to bloated readings of the coverage of the 
Establishment Clause). 
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period (1995-2005) the Rehnquist Court heard eleven cases bringing religion 
clause challenges16 and the Burger Court (1976-1986) heard a whopping 
twenty-seven cases, most of them concerning the Establishment Clause.17  
Even more striking is that the Roberts Court has only once exercised the 
power of judicial review to strike down federal or state laws, policies, or 
practices as violating the religion clauses. Indeed, in two of its four 
Establishment Clause cases it did not reach the merits because it found lack of 
standing to bring a claim.18 Even in those cases that are primarily about the 
Speech Clause—where the Court has otherwise been far more willing to strike 
down laws and policies as unconstitutional19—and only indirectly about 
religious freedom, the Court has held its fire.20 The single law and religion case 
where the Court exercised judicial review to invalidate a law is Hosanna-Tabor 
 
 16.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 
(2002); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). Though some of 
these cases (Watchtower, Good News Club, Rosenberger, and Pinette) were decided on the 
basis of the Speech Clause, they also indirectly implicated issues of free exercise and 
establishment. Since this Article includes cases decided by the Roberts Court whose primary 
basis was the Speech Clause and that only indirectly implicated the religion clauses, it 
includes similarly situated cases for prior Supreme Courts as well. 
 17.  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Sch. Dist. of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Tony 
& Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 
(1983); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 
(1982); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) 
(presenting, technically, a Speech Clause case but implicating the religion clauses); Heffron 
v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 
646 (1980); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 
490 (1979); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 
125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 
426 U.S. 736 (1976); Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  
18. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2010);  Hein v. Freedom 
from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 19.  See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); Snyder v. 
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). On the 
expansion of the Speech Clause at the hands of the Roberts Court, to the detriment of 
precedent, see generally Randy J. Kozel, Second Thoughts About the First Amendment 
(Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 1434, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2476586.  
 20.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
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Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, involving the ministerial exception to 
the reach of anti-discrimination laws as applied to religious institutions.21  
Judicial restraint has many meanings, but it is often conceived as a court’s 
unwillingness to overturn state and federal legislation, policy, or practice as 
unconstitutional.22 Some scholars and others have insisted that the Roberts 
Court is by this measure an “activist” court, or even “extraordinarily activist.”23 
As respects the religion clauses, this Article disagrees: the Roberts Court has in 
fact been considerably more restrained in this sense than both the Rehnquist 
and Burger Courts when it comes to religion clause jurisprudence.24 In the 
 
 21.  Even Hosanna-Tabor reflects only a particular, narrow kind of judicial review, 
inasmuch as the Court held that the ministerial exception was an exception to the scope of 
anti-discrimination laws. It did not strike down those laws generally, but merely limited their 
reach. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705-06 (2011) 
(“Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 
and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly 
recognized the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that 
precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship 
between a religious institution and its ministers. We agree that there is such a ministerial 
exception.”). It is the type of judicial review also exercised by the Burger Court in NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the Court held that schools 
operated by churches are not subject to various state-imposed labor regulations. But it differs 
from the type of judicial review in which the Court strikes down a particular law or policy as 
categorically unconstitutional.  
22. See  Marc O. DeGirolami & Kevin C. Walsh, Judge Posner, Judge Wilkinson, and 
Judicial Critique of Constitutional Theory, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633 (2014). Some argue 
that judicial restraint properly refers specifically to judicial reticence to overturn legislative 
acts (federal or state) alone. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-
Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519 (2012). But I include government policies or practices both 
because there are relatively few cases about the religion clauses decided by the Court at all 
and because judicial review is in fact exercised to review legislative and executive action. 
 23.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 863 (2010) (“The conservatism of 
October Term 2009 differs from that of October Term 1988. The latter emphasized great 
deference to the decisions of the elected branches of government, but the current 
conservatism shows little such deference, especially when deference conflicts with the 
conservative judicial ideology.”); Gene Nichol, Trumping Politics: The Roberts Court and 
“Judicial” Review, 46 TULSA L. REV. 421, 422 n.8 (2011) (“This essay makes the 
intemperate claim that the Roberts Court majority has become an extraordinarily 
interventionist, activist, ideological, and even partisan force in our present structure of 
government.”); ‘Meet the Press’ (NBC television broadcast April 11, 2011) (transcript 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36362669/ns/meet_the_press/t/meet-press-
transcript-april) (recording the comment of Senator Leahy that the Roberts Court “is the 
most activist court in my lifetime”). While observing that the term “activist” is meaningless, 
Pamela Karlan nevertheless offers the view that “the Roberts Court has lost faith in the 
democratic process.” Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 29 (2012). As this Article shows, however, this claim is problematic with respect to 
the Roberts Court’s law and religion jurisprudence, where the Court’s deference to 
democratic processes seems to be robust.  
 24.  The claims here are therefore consistent with, but stronger than, the conclusions 
reached by Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin, who write that though the Roberts Court is not 
“especially” activist, neither is it especially restrained. See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, 
Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, 
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Rehnquist Court’s final ten years, it struck down state or federal laws, policies, 
or practices as (directly or indirectly) violating the religion clauses in four 
cases.25 It is also worth noting that in its final decade, the Rehnquist Court 
agreed to hear more cases seeking to invalidate government laws, policies, or 
practices than the Roberts Court, even when ultimately it did not rule against 
the government.26 A comparable analysis of the Burger Court in its final 
decade shows it to have been a great deal more aggressive than its successors in 
its exercise of judicial review as to the religion clauses: in 1985 alone, it struck 
down four state laws as violating the Establishment Clause; altogether it struck 
down laws, policies, or practices as unconstitutional under the religion clauses 
in fourteen cases.27 
Justice Rehnquist once objected to the “heavy First Amendment artillery 
that the Court fires at” “sensible and unobjectionable” legislation,28 and the 
Roberts Court seems to have taken his criticism to heart. There are likely 
several explanations for the Court’s preference for keeping its judicial review 
powder dry, but three stand out as especially plausible. 
 
State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737 (2012). In the religion clause context, the Roberts 
Court is especially restrained by this measure.  
 25.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Watchtower Bible and Tract 
Soc’y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (holding village ordinance 
unconstitutional on the basis of the Speech and Free Exercise Clauses); Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 
(2000). The Rehnquist Court also held in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was unconstitutional as applied to the states, but 
Boerne is not included in the Rehnquist Court’s judicial review tally because the religion 
clauses themselves are truly peripheral to the Court’s holding.  
 26.  Cases in which the Rehnquist Court declined to invalidate a government statute, 
policy, or practice on religion clause grounds include Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); 
and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 27.  Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 
U.S. 402 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (presenting a speech case with 
implications for free exercise); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 
U.S. 490 (1979); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); New York. v. Cathedral Acad., 
434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).  
In its last ten years, the Burger Court upheld government laws, policies, and practices 
against constitutional challenge on the basis of the religion clauses in Bowen v. Roy, 476 
U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of 
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 
471 U.S. 290 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 
(1982); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 
U.S. 646 (1980); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 
426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
 28.  Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. at 130 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
392 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 26:385 
First, the current Court’s docket is much smaller than in years past: in the 
2013 term the Roberts Court agreed to hear seventy-five cases,29 where thirty 
years ago more than double that number would not have been uncommon.30 
Fewer cases overall may mean fewer cases seeking judicial review.31 More 
importantly, there may not be anything unique about the religion clauses. As 
Keith Whittington has observed, the Roberts Court has in general been far more 
reluctant to exercise the power of judicial review to invalidate laws than any of 
its predecessors: 
Under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has struck down statutes at an annual 
average rate of 3.8 cases, which is the fewest since before the Civil War (only 
the Gilded Age Courts are even close) . . . . The Roberts Court has struck 
down federal law in fewer cases, on average, than any modern Court, with the 
exception of the immediate post-New Deal Courts. The change is even more 
striking in cases involving the invalidation of state laws. The Roberts Court 
has struck down state laws in fewer cases per year than any Court since the 
Civil War, by a significant margin.32  
Indeed, the substantial decline of judicial review involving the religion 
clauses from the Burger Court’s last decade to the Rehnquist Court’s last 
decade noted earlier (from fourteen to four) is also consistent with 
Whittington’s claim that “ironically, the Rehnquist Court that was denounced 
as among the most activist might instead be the harbinger of a period of 
sustained judicial restraint not seen since before the Progressive Era.”33 The 
Roberts Court may simply be following the course set by the Rehnquist Court 
in this respect.  
Nevertheless, while it is true that the Roberts Court’s judicial-review 
asceticism as to the religion clauses may in part reflect its more general 
reluctance to strike down state and federal law, there are specific features of 
religion clause doctrine that further and more deeply explain the striking, 
 
 29.  Supreme Court of the United States, 2013 Term Opinions of the Court, 
WWW.SUPREMECOURT.GOV (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/ 
slipopinions.aspx?Term=13. 
 30.  Compare 2013 Term Opinions of the Court, SUP. CT. UNITED STATES (Aug. 24, 
2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx?Term=13 (indicating that, 
during the October term of 2013, the Supreme Court issued seventy-five slip opinions), with 
U.S. REPS. Vols. 543-45, 513-15, and id. vols. 469-73 (Aug. 24, 2014), available at 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Index?collection=usreports&set_as_cursor=clear (indicating that 
during the October terms of 2004, 1994, and 1984 the Supreme Court issued 80, 93, and 165 
slip opinions, respectively). On the Court’s shrinking docket, see David R. Stras, The 
Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 151 (2010).  
 31.  In addition to a shrinking docket, it is possible that the number of certiorari 
petitions bringing religion clause challenges has decreased over time. Thanks to Mike Perino 
for raising this issue. 
 32.  Whittington, supra note 1, at 2227. 
 33.  Id. at 2230. 
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comparative rarity of Roberts Court judicial review in this particular context.34 
The most prominent of these is that the law of religious accommodation—one 
of the most vital issues of religious free exercise that at one time implicated the 
Free Exercise Clause directly—has by now largely become entirely statutory. 
The Roberts Court has decided or issued substantive orders in four cases 
involving either RFRA or RLUIPA.35 In the same period it has decided only 
one case (perhaps) partially about the Free Exercise Clause, a case in any event 
that is arguably not about religious accommodation at all and that represents a 
carve-out from general free exercise principles.36 The single case that brought 
both statutory and free exercise claims was resolved solely on the basis of the 
statutory claim without any decision as to free exercise.37  
It is tempting to attribute the reason for this transition from the Free 
Exercise Clause to statutory law entirely to the holding of Employment Division 
v. Smith, which ostensibly precluded judicial review as to laws that are neutral 
and of general application.38 To be sure, the rule announced in Smith has 
contracted the number of Free Exercise Clause challenges. And yet there are 
features of Smith—most notably the issue of the meaning of “general 
applicability” and the scope of what I have elsewhere described as the 
“individual-assessment exception” to Smith—that have suggested to several 
lower courts that accommodations are constitutionally required more often than 
 
 34.  It should be noted that the percentage drop in overall cases decided among the 
Courts studied here is considerably lower than the percentage drop in religion clause cases 
decided, which is in turn lower than the percentage drop in religion clause cases as to which 
judicial review was exercised. In its final decade, the Burger Court averaged 164.8 total slip 
opinions per year, while the comparable numbers for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are 
107.4 and 80.6 respectively. See Harold J. Spaeth, et al., Version 2014 Release 01, 2014 SUP. 
CT. DATABASE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://supremecourtdatabase.org. That represents a drop of 
approximately fifty-two percent from the Burger to the Roberts Court. By contrast, the 
comparison in the number of law and religion cases heard by the Burger Court over its last 
decade and the Roberts Court to date—twenty-seven and seven respectively—reflects a drop 
of about seventy-four percent. Finally, the comparison in the number of law and religion 
cases as to which the two Courts exercised judicial review—fourteen and one, 
respectively—reflects a drop of approximately ninety-three percent. These differences in 
percentage drop suggest that there may be more to the contraction in law and religion cases 
specifically than may be explained simply by the Court’s generally shrinking docket. 
 35.  See supra notes 6-7. 
 36.  Hosanna-Tabor may be more properly characterized as concerning the doctrine of 
church autonomy and the limits of non-discrimination law, rather than accommodation from 
neutral, generally applicable law. For further discussion see Marc O. DeGirolami, Free 
Exercise by Moonlight, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587216.  
 37.  The claimants in Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377 
(2013)—which was consolidated with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.—brought free 
exercise claims as well as RFRA claims. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2766 (2014). The Court declined to rule on the free exercise claim. Id. at 2785 (“Our 
decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim 
raised by Conestoga and the Hahns.”).  
 38.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
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may appear under Smith.39 To date, however, the Supreme Court has declined 
to hear any cases raising either a direct challenge to Smith or a challenge 
implicating Smith.40 
Moreover, the Court has recently suggested that the statutory protections 
for religious free exercise under RFRA are more capacious than those afforded 
by the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.41 As Justice Alito wrote 
in his opinion for the Court in Hobby Lobby: “By enacting RFRA, Congress 
went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally required. . . . 
Nothing in the text of RFRA as originally enacted suggested that the statutory 
phrase ‘exercise of religion under the First Amendment’ was meant to be tied 
to this Court's pre-Smith interpretation of that Amendment.”42 If that dictum is 
followed and entrenched, it might become even more difficult than it is now to 
obtain review in a suit against state and local governments, as the scope of what 
is protected by the Free Exercise Clause may continue to diminish by contrast 
with what is available under RFRA.43 
All of the foregoing concerns the Free Exercise Clause, but the Court’s 
contraction of judicial review as to the Establishment Clause is even more 
conspicuous, since the great majority of religion clause cases in which the 
Rehnquist and Burger Courts exercised judicial review concerned 
establishment. Entirely new and expansive theories of the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause were advanced or entrenched by those Courts.44 The 
Roberts Court has to date been much more restrained. In the only case directly 
testing the limits of the Establishment Clause, the Roberts Court reaffirmed a 
Burger Court precedent45 in upholding the practice of legislative prayer against 
constitutional challenge on historical grounds that essentially ignored several of 
the sundry tests of its predecessors.46 The Court’s other Establishment Clause 
cases have either limited standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge 
or (arguably) provided a constitutional ground for the ministerial exception.  
 
 39.  MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 160-65 (2013); see 
also Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2011); 
Richard A. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and 
the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 884 (2001). 
 40.  This notwithstanding considerable uncertainty in the lower courts about the precise 
coverage of Smith. See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 39 at 160-65.  
 41.  Some have argued that RFRA may be a “super-statute” or that it has “quasi-
constitutional” status. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 
(2014) (describing, but not endorsing, this view); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 254. The dicta in Justice Alito’s opinion suggest 
that RFRA may have even more power than the Free Exercise Clause itself. 
 42.  Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2767, 2772. 
 43.  This will depend in part on the existence and interpretation of state RFRAs or state 
constitutional protections.  
 44.  E.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 45.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 46.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
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The Roberts Court’s denials of certiorari in Establishment Clause cases are 
instructive as well. The Court has declined to hear four cases in which a circuit 
court reviewed a state or local practice on Establishment Clause grounds.47 In 
three of the four cases, the circuit court had struck down the state law or 
practice. Since it takes the votes of only four Justices to agree to hear a case, 
one possibility is that the liberal wing of the Court is consistently voting against 
accepting certiorari in these types of cases, thereby avoiding a contest that it is 
not unlikely to lose over the continued vitality of the Lemon test or the 
endorsement test as well as leaving in place circuit court decisions that struck 
down government laws and practices on the basis of more expansive 
interpretations of the Establishment Clause articulated by prior Supreme 
Courts.48 A second possibility (not incompatible with the first) is that at least 
some members of the conservative wing of the Court are voting to deny 
certiorari because they can implement their views about the Establishment 
Clause simply by limiting standing to bring a claim at all. At any rate, the 
dissents from denial of certiorari and related “statements” by Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito, in combination with Justice Kennedy’ opinion in Town of 
Greece ignoring the Lemon and endorsement tests altogether and instead 
discussing (in a portion of the opinion commanding only a plurality of the 
Court) the coercion test,49 may suggest that the Roberts Court will not be 
striking down laws as violating the Establishment Clause any time soon. It has 
been steadily withdrawing from the constitutional stage. 
 
 47.  Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a high 
school graduation held in a church violated the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 2283 (2014). Justice Scalia dissented from denial of certiorari in Elmbrook and was 
joined by Justice Thomas. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a large cross displayed in a war memorial located on public land violates the 
Establishment Clause), cert. denied sub nom. Mount Soledad Memorial Assoc. v. Trunk, 132 
S. Ct. 2535 (2012). Justice Alito joined in the denial of certiorari in Trunk but authored a 
“statement” indicating that the reason was not agreement with the Ninth Circuit on the 
Establishment Clause merits. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 
2010) (holding that memorial crosses on the side of a highway offended the endorsement 
test), cert. denied sub nom. Utah Highway Patrol Assoc. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 
(2011). Justice Thomas authored a lengthy dissent from denial of certiorari in Utah Highway 
Patrol. Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to state law requiring public schools to authorize 
period for voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2992 
(2011). 
 48.  Even in the First Circuit Pledge case, where the First Circuit upheld a statute 
setting aside public school time for voluntary recitation of the pledge, the court used the 
Lemon test and the endorsement test to reach that result. Hanover Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d at 9-
12. 
 49.  Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819-28; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992). 
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II.   CONTRACTION IN THE RANGE OF VOTING PATTERNS 
A second and narrower phenomenon of constitutional contraction concerns 
a reduction in the range of voting patterns in law and religion cases. That might 
signal a concomitant contraction in the number of distinctive views among the 
Justices about the scope and meaning of the religion clauses, or it might simply 
indicate an increased reticence to express those views in individual written 
opinions, or it might suggest something about the increasing ideological 
polarization of the Court when it comes to law and religion issues. The votes of 
the Justices over the last decade in law and religion cases overwhelmingly 
reflect only two distributional patterns: unanimity or a 5-4 split that correlates 
with the standard ideological divisions. The Roberts Court has issued four 
unanimous law and religion decisions as to the result50 and six decisions split 
5-4.51 As to the unanimous cases, O Centro contained no separate concurring 
opinions, Hosanna-Tabor contained concurrences by Justice Thomas and by 
Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kagan) offering slightly stronger theories of the 
ministerial exception than that adopted by the Court, Holt v. Hobbs likewise 
contained two curt concurrences by Justice Ginsburg (totaling two sentences) 
and Justice Sotomayor, and Summum contained very brief concurrences by 
Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg), Justice Scalia (joined by Justice 
Thomas), Justice Breyer, and Justice Souter (who concurred only in the 
judgment of the Court). The 5-4 decisions almost all contain a dominant, 
lengthy dissenting opinion joined in full by every dissenting Justice.52 
 
 50.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460 (2009); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006). 
 51.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Town of Greece, 
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2010); 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 
(2010); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). The Wheaton College 
substantive order involving a preliminary injunction broke down six to three, with Justice 
Breyer joining the conservative wing of the Court. The only other case indirectly involving 
law and religion decided by the Roberts Court is Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011), 
which concerned states’ sovereign immunity from actions for damages under RLUIPA. The 
distribution of votes was six to two. 
 52.  The principal dissent in Hobby Lobby was authored by Justice Ginsburg, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and though Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Kagan) 
authored an additional, extremely short dissent on a narrow issue, id. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting), they both joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in full. The principal dissent in Town of 
Greece was authored by Justice Kagan. 134 S. Ct. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Once 
again, Justice Breyer authored a separate, narrow, fact-specific dissent and once again he 
also joined the principal dissent in full. 134 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The only 
dissent in Winn was authored by Justice Kagan (joined in full by all dissenting Justices). 131 
S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The only dissent in Hein was authored by Justice 
Souter (joined in full by all dissenting Justices). 551 U.S. at 637 (Alio, J., dissenting). The 
only dissent in Christian Legal Society was authored by Justice Alito (joined in full by all 
dissenting Justices). 561 U.S.at 706. The somewhat exceptional case here is Buono, in which 
Justice Stevens authored a dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor), 559 U.S. at 
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Once again, the contrast with prior Courts is noticeable. The voting pattern 
in law and religion cases of the Rehnquist Court in its final decade was far 
more varied: of the Court’s eleven cases, one—Cutter v. Wilkinson—was 
unanimous and four were split 5-4, but one decision split 8-1,53 two split 7-2,54 
and three split 6-3.55 The Burger Court’s voting pattern over its last decade was 
even more diverse: four 9-0 decisions, four 8-1 decisions,56 one 7-2 decision, 
five 6-3 decisions, and thirteen 5-4 decisions. 
What can one learn from the reduction in the range of voting patterns 
observable in the Roberts Court? Caution is in order given the paucity of law 
and religion cases decided by the Roberts Court (particularly by comparison 
with the extremely large number of religion clause cases heard by the Burger 
Court), as well as the difficulty of piecing together explanations for voting 
patterns in general. Any judgments will be speculative.  
One marked difference among these three periods of time is the Court’s 
desire (or capacity) for unanimity among the three Supreme Courts studied 
here. This past term alone, the Roberts Court has reached unanimity as to the 
result in roughly two-thirds of its cases, an astonishingly high percentage.57 
Three unanimous law and religion decisions in ten years is an extremely 
unusual tally. In the Rehnquist Court’s final ten years, it achieved unanimity in 
only one case, Cutter v. Wilkinson.58 Despite hearing nearly four times the 
number of law and religion cases heard by the Roberts Court, the Burger 
Court’s final decade likewise saw only one unanimous decision in United 
States v. Lee.59  
 
735 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Justice Breyer authored a separate, narrower dissent, with-
out joining Justice Stevens’s dissent, 559 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 53.  Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 536 U.S. 150, 172 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 54.  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); 
Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting (joined by 
Justice Ginsburg)). 
 55.  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 130 (2001) (Stevens J., 
dissenting); id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867 (2000) 
(Souter, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 56.  Justice Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in three of the four 8-1 opinions. Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 128 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Estate of Thornton v. 
Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White 
dissented alone in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). 
 57.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Despite Hard Cases, Supreme Court Displays Remarkable 
Degree of Unanimity, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/25/despite-hard-
cases-supreme-court-displays-remarkable-degree-of-unanimity. 
 58.  544 U.S. 709 (2005).  
 59.  455 U.S. 252 (1982). The only other intervening unanimous law and religion 
decisions have been Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); and Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).  
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Furthermore, each of the Roberts Court’s unanimous law and religion 
decisions was decided on narrow and highly particularized grounds. O Centro 
was a context-specific application of RFRA; Summum was not even decided on 
religion clause grounds at all, but by recourse to a narrow application of the 
doctrine of government speech; the Court took great pains to emphasize the 
limited scope of its decision in Hosanna-Tabor; and the same narrowness of 
scope is evident in Holt v. Hobbs, whose outcome was due in no small part to 
the state’s weak legal advocacy. Though it is true that some of the Roberts 
Court’s unanimous law and religion decisions have contained concurrences, 
those, too, have generally been narrow. These concurrences have by and large 
not reflected totally different rationales for the result from the majority 
opinions, and their authors have, in the main, joined the Court’s majority 
opinion.  
Second, the difficulty of achieving unanimity in religion clause cases is 
exacerbated by their highly ideological quality. Michael Heise and Gregory 
Sisk concluded in one of their empirical studies of the federal judiciary that 
political factors are particularly powerful with respect to decisions about the 
Establishment Clause: 
Whether celebrated as a proper integration of political and moral reasoning 
into constitutional judging, shrugged off as mere realism about judges being 
motivated to promote their political attitudes, or deprecated as a troubling 
departure from the aspirational ideal of neutral and impartial judging, the 
powerful role of political factors in Establishment Clause decisions appears 
undeniable and substantial. In the context of federal court claims implicating 
questions of Church and State, it appears to be ideology much, if not all, of the 
way down.60 
Heise and Sisk’s findings with respect to political ideology’s influence on 
free exercise and religious accommodation cases are far less stark, but they do 
find that other extra-legal ideological factors are relevant there as well.61 
The politicized quality of law and religion controversies may well be 
reflected in the Roberts Court’s ideological 5-4 voting patterns in the majority 
of its law and religion cases. Yet apart from ideological division itself, there is 
the separate issue of ideological bloc voting. When the liberal wing of the 
Roberts Court dissents, it tends to do so in a bloc in which all dissenters join 
the principal dissent;62 likewise in the single law and religion-related case 
 
 60.  Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?: An Empirical 
Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 
1204 (2012).  
 61.  Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 
(2013).  
 62.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Town of Greece, 
134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2010); 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 
(2010); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
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where the conservative wing was in the minority.63 The maverick (or at least 
unpredictable) jurisprudential viewpoint in law and religion cases has all but 
disappeared, a perspective that could be found in both liberal and conservative 
jurists of the past. The sort of jurisprudence reflected in the totality of Justice 
Brennan’s opinions—a strict separationist approach to the Establishment 
Clause64 in combination with expansive protection for free exercise,65 
including support for tax exemptions for churches66—is not to be found on the 
current Court. An example on the other side of the ideological spectrum might 
be Justice White, who authored the opinion for the Court in Board of Education 
v. Allen67 and dissented in Widmar v. Vincent,68 but also authored the majority 
opinions in Frazee69 and Amos,70 and dissented in Grand Rapids v. Ball and 
Aguilar v. Felton.71 These Justices took positions in religion clause cases that 
made it more complicated to mark them down as either entirely pro- or anti-
religion from an ideologically partisan point of view.72 The increase in bloc 
voting in the Roberts Court may suggest that the reliability of partisan 
pigeonholing with respect to religion has increased. 
Third, bloc voting makes it less likely that the Justices will stake out and 
defend grand theories of the religion clauses that are doctrinally idiosyncratic 
(or creative). Narrow opinions have a greater likelihood of attracting more 
 
 63.  Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. 661. 
 64.  See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578 (1987); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).  
 65.  See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 513 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 66.  See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see 
also Michael W. McConnell, Justice Brennan’s Accommodating Approach Toward Religion, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2007). 
 67.  392 U.S. 236 (1968) (striking down a law requiring school districts to purchase 
and loan textbooks to students enrolled in parochial schools on equal terms with those 
enrolled in public schools as violating the Establishment Clause). 
 68.  454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (“I have long argued that 
Establishment Clause limits on state action which incidentally aids religion are not as strict 
as the Court has held. The step from the permissible to the necessary, however, is a long one. 
In my view, just as there is room under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have 
some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state policies that may incidentally 
burden religion. In other words, I believe the States to be a good deal freer to formulate 
policies that affect religion in divergent ways than does the majority.”). 
 69.  489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits to worker who 
refused position because job would have required him to work on Sunday violated free 
exercise clause of First Amendment). 
 70.  483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding Title VII exemption to religious discrimination as 
to non-profit activities of religious organization against Establishment Clause challenge).  
 71.  473 U.S. 373, 400 (White, J., dissenting) (“I have long disagreed with the Court's 
interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause in the context of state aid to 
private schools . . . . I am satisfied that what the States have sought to do in these cases is 
well within their authority and is not forbidden by the Establishment Clause.”). 
 72.  Justice Thomas’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is doctrinally idiosyncratic, 
but it is not unpredictable from a politically partisan perspective. 
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signatories, inasmuch as other Justices may be less concerned about the 
unintended reach of deeper, broader, maximalist opinions in future cases.73 The 
opinions of the Roberts Court in this area show that the Justices are generally 
disinclined from writing in what Karl Llewellyn once described (and praised) 
as the “Grand Style.”74 Their preference for a more “Formal Style”75 may have 
resulted in opinions that more of their colleagues are comfortable joining. A 
propensity to write tighter, narrower opinions may induce otherwise like-
minded Justices to unite, but it might also persuade Justices who view deeper 
questions altogether differently to come together on more focused issues. 
Justices Alito and Kagan have very different perspectives on the relationship of 
church and state, and yet Justice Kagan joined Justice Alito’s concurrence in 
Hosanna-Tabor in an opinion which elaborated a slightly more potent version 
of the ministerial exception than was advanced by the majority.76  
A comparison of the principal dissenting opinions in the Court’s two 
legislative prayer decisions, Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. 
Galloway—the former decided by the Burger Court, the latter by the Roberts 
Court—is also instructive in this respect. Justice Brennan’s dissent in Marsh is 
a magniloquently sweeping separationist credo. “The Establishment Clause,” 
he intoned,  
is, to its core, nothing less and nothing more than a statement about the proper 
role of government in the society that we have shaped for ourselves in this 
land. The Establishment Clause embodies a judgment, born of a long and 
turbulent history, that, in our society, religion “must be a private matter for the 
individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice.”77  
After this flourish, Justice Brennan proceeded to announce several principles 
within “[t]he imperatives of separation and neutrality” undergirding the 
Establishment Clause, including non-interference with “the essential autonomy 
 
 73.  On judicial minimalism and maximalism, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). The Roberts Court’s 
general preference for judicial minimalism is remarked in Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 
What Conservative Constitutional Revolution? Moderating Five Degrees of Judicial 
Conservatism After Six Years of the Roberts Court, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 69 (2011) (“[The 
Roberts Court’s] decisions typically comport with the precepts of minimalism, avoiding 
constitutional issues when possible, respecting the holdings of prior decisions, resolving 
controversies in small steps, relying on incremental rules, and providing an opportunity for a 
dialogue on constitutional meaning.”).  
 74.  See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 5 
(1960). Features of the Grand Style include an emphasis on principle over doctrine and an 
ongoing “quest” in opinion-writing to find the “best law.” Id. at 36.  
 75.  See id. at 287-96 (listing as features of the Formal Style the controlling force of 
doctrine and the importance of fine doctrinal distinctions, rather than broad principles, in 
advancing the law). 
 76.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
711 (2012) (highlighting the importance of “formal ordination and designation as a 
‘minister’”). 
 77.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 625 (1971)). 
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of religious life” and that “[w]ith regard to matters that are essentially 
religious . . . there should be no political battles, and . . . no American should at 
any point feel alienated from his government.”78 Striking down legislative 
prayer as categorically unconstitutional, he concluded, would have “invigorated 
both the ‘spirit of religion,’ and the ‘spirit of freedom.’”79 His paean to 
separationism as the constitutional essence of religious freedom and religious 
individuality was certainly heartfelt, but it was also an idiosyncratically 
expansive reading of the Establishment Clause evoking some of the more 
extreme separationist blasts of the late Vinson and Warren Courts. It should 
therefore come as little surprise that Justice Brennan’s Marsh dissent was 
joined only by Justice Marshall; Justice Stevens, who also dissented, did not 
join it.80 
By contrast, Justice Kagan’s dissent in the more recent legislative prayer 
case, Town of Greece, was much narrower. Her dissent accepted the continued 
legitimacy of the historical framework of Marsh.81 It even went so far—
unnecessarily far—as to express positive agreement with Marsh.82 Though the 
dissent was framed as vindicating the idea of “religious equality,” it did not 
stake out a deep political philosophy of the relationship of religion and 
government to be superimposed on the Establishment Clause. In fact, Justice 
Kagan disclaimed that what appeared to be a grand principle “translates here 
into a bright separationist line.”83 In actuality the dissent’s principal 
disagreement with the Court was not over the fundamental consistency of 
legislative prayer with “religious equality” or some other deep vision of the 
Establishment Clause but over the reach of Marsh84 and over factual particulars 
concerning whether the town had been sufficiently conscientious in 
encouraging ecumenical language and attempting to include non-Christian 
prayer-givers: 
If the Town Board had let its chaplains know that they should speak in 
nonsectarian terms, common to diverse religious groups, then no one would 
 
 78.  Id. at 805-06. 
 79.  Id. at 822. 
 80.  A doctrinally idiosyncratic opinion need not be legally incorrect; it may be quite 
correct. The point here is merely that a doctrinally idiosyncratic opinion is often less likely to 
be joined by other Justices. Justice Thomas, for example, has several times advanced an 
originalist, non-incorporationist reading of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). It may well 
be the right interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but to date, no other member of the 
Court has joined these specific parts of these opinions. 
 81.  134 S. Ct. at 1841-42 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 82.  Id. at 1845 (“Relying on that ‘unbroken’ national tradition, Marsh upheld (I think 
correctly) the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day with a chaplain’s prayer 
as ‘a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.’”). 
 83.  Id. at 1841. 
 84.  Id. (“I agree with the majority that the issue here is ‘whether the prayer practice in 
the Town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures.’ Where I depart from the majority is in my reply to that question.”). 
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have valid grounds for complaint . . . . Or if the Board preferred, it might have 
invited clergy of many faiths to serve as chaplains, as the majority notes that 
Congress does . . . . So Greece had multiple ways of incorporating prayer into 
its town meetings—reflecting all the ways that prayer (as most of us know 
from daily life) can forge common bonds, rather than divide.85 
As Justice Alito astutely observed, though some of the rhetoric of Justice 
Kagan’s opinion swept more broadly, “the principal dissent, in the end, would 
demand no more than a small modification in the procedure that the town of 
Greece initially followed.”86 Yet the point here is not about the merits of the 
various opinions or about minimalist and maximalist opinions generally, but 
that notwithstanding some of the more florid language in Justice Kagan’s 
dissent,87 its ultimate basis was quite narrow. And just as the breadth of the 
Grand Style in Justice Brennan’s Marsh dissent may have dissuaded other 
Justices to join it, the narrowness of the Formal Style in Justice Kagan’s Town 
of Greece dissent may have drawn in the remainder of the liberal bloc, 
producing yet another five-to-four result. 
III.   CONTRACTION IN COVERAGE 
The Roberts Court’s first decade has also seen contraction in the 
substantive coverage of the religion clauses. Although this is the most 
speculative of the three varieties of contraction explored in this Article (in part 
because the Roberts Court has decided relatively few cases in this area to 
date),88 there have already been some definitive doctrinal contractions and 
some contracting trends are underway.  
It may be helpful before discussing these to offer a framework for 
evaluating what contraction or expansion as to the clauses’ coverage entails. 
For simplicity, this Article refers to “broad” and “narrow” approaches to 
 
 85.  Id. at 1852. 
 86.  Id. at 1831 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 87.  See, e.g., id. at 1851, 1854 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In this country, when citizens 
go before the government, they go not as Christians or Muslims or Jews (or what have you), 
but just as Americans (or here, as Grecians). That is what it means to be an equal citizen, 
irrespective of religion . . . . When the citizens of this country approach their government, 
they do so only as Americans, not as members of one faith or another.”). For criticism, see 
Marc O. DeGirolami, The Traditional Frame: Justice Kagan’s Dissent and Justice Alito’s 
Concurrence in Town of Greece, CENTER FOR L. & RELIGION F. (Apr. 10, 2015), 
http://clrforum.org/2014/05/06/the-traditional-frame-justice-kagans-dissent-and-justice-
alitos-concurrence-in-town-of-greece.  
 88.  There may be some relationship between contraction in the exercise of judicial 
review, see supra Part I, and contraction in substantive coverage. A Court that never strikes a 
law down as unconstitutional may in the process be narrowing the coverage of certain civil 
rights. There may be fewer cases for judicial review because there is less for the religion 
clauses to do. But a refusal to strike down a law may have the effect of reaffirming existing 
precedent, and of retaining the existing substantive coverage. Contraction in the exercise of 
judicial review need not necessarily mean contraction in substantive coverage. 
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coverage.89 A broad free exercise view reads the Free Exercise Clause 
expansively—in favor of generous constitutional rights to accommodation from 
neutral, generally applicable laws on the basis of religious scruple and generous 
rights of institutional autonomy and insulation from government intrusion. A 
narrow free exercise view reads the Free Exercise Clause only to require 
accommodations in unusual circumstances, as when a religion is being 
explicitly targeted for discriminatory treatment or when it would cost nothing 
to accommodate a religious objector, and few or no rights of religious 
institutional autonomy. A broad Establishment Clause view reads the clause to 
demand strict separation of church and state, or a progressively unyielding 
application of the Lemon test or the endorsement test. A narrow Establishment 
Clause view reads the clause as covering less—as prohibiting various kinds of 
coercive action by the state, for example, or as prohibiting certain historically 
clear-cut cases of establishment such as control over doctrine and personnel, 
compulsory church attendance, restrictions on political participation, and 
several others,90 but little else of what the modern Supreme Court has said is 
prohibited by the clause.  
The broad/narrow scheme is not meant to capture any single person’s 
views with precision (there are always complications and nuances). It is instead 
a crude but useful typology of religion clause outlooks. So, for example, one 
could characterize Justice Scalia’s religion clause jurisprudence as generally 
favoring narrow free exercise and narrow establishment rights relative to other 
Justices.91 In the legal academy, scholars including Kent Greenawalt and 
Douglas Laycock have tended to support broad free exercise and broad 
establishment readings of the clauses,92 while others including Marci Hamilton 
and Caroline Corbin have argued for a narrow free exercise and a broad 
establishment interpretation.93 Still others including Philip Hamburger and 
 
 89.  For a similar taxonomy with different aims, see Micah Schwartzman, What If 
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1358-77 (2012). Nothing complimentary 
or pejorative is intended by the terms “narrow” or “broad.” A narrow waistline may be 
preferable to a broad one, just as a broad horizon may be preferable to a narrow one. At any 
rate, the terms are used here for the descriptive purposes of making comparisons among a 
range of possible perspectives, not to indicate agreement or disagreement with those 
perspectives. 
 90.  For further discussion of these clear-cut examples from the early history of the 
Establishment Clause, see Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at 
the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131-76 
(2004). 
 91.  See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring);  Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).  
 92.  See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS (2005); 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2007); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Douglas 
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997).  
 93.  See, e.g., MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF 
LAW (2005); Caroline Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
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Richard Garnett tend to favor narrow readings of both clauses.94 I myself have 
argued for a comparatively broad free exercise and narrow establishment 
regime based on historical considerations,95 and similar classifications could be 
made for almost anyone who has discussed the coverage of the religion 
clauses.96 
There are three ways in which the Roberts Court has contracted the 
substantive coverage of the religion clauses, thereby favoring narrow readings 
of both. First, no Justice on the current Court has shown any inclination to 
reverse the narrow interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause established by the 
Smith decision. If anything, the Court has ratified that interpretation in the only 
case that appears to extend the reach of the Free Exercise Clause—Hosanna-
Tabor. It is certainly possible to read Hosanna-Tabor as a broad free exercise 
case, inasmuch as the Court for the first time explicitly found there to be a 
constitutionally mandated exception to the reach of the government’s 
antidiscrimination laws. But it may be more accurate and far-sighted to see that 
holding as simply a carve-out from the more general rule of Smith with respect 
to religious accommodations, which was reaffirmed in Hosanna-Tabor. No 
Justice signaled any disagreement with the Smith rule in Hosanna-Tabor,97 
though Justice Alito, as a circuit judge, interpreted Smith warily, as still 
subjecting to strict scrutiny several governmental regulations that affected 
religion.98 Yet in the absence of any contrary indication, in what could be seen 
as the sole case about the Free Exercise Clause, the Roberts Court implicitly 
confirmed its unanimous allegiance to a narrow approach to free exercise. 
Second, perhaps the principal doctrinal contribution of the Roberts Court to 
establishment jurisprudence has been to contract taxpayer standing to bring an 
 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Caroline 
Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 
(2010). 
 94.  See, e.g., PHILIP A. HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); 
Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2011); Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the 
Establishment Clause, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 273 (2008); Philip A. Hamburger, A 
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 915 (1992).  
 95.  See DEGIROLAMI, supra note 39, 147-206. 
 96.  This includes Supreme Court Justices: I have already mentioned Justice Scalia, and 
other Justices can be roughly categorized within this framework.  
 97.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
707 (2012); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye was also unanimous as to the judgment, though 
several concurrences articulated fundamental disagreements with the Smith free exercise 
framework. Id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring). It is 
possible that the Court’s opinion in Lukumi itself so weakened and limited the scope of 
Smith that nobody on the current Court is likely to object to Smith any longer. This reading 
of Lukumi, however, is not one that most courts share. Thanks to Paul Horwitz for pressing 
this point. 
 98.  See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2004); Fraternal Order of 
Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Establishment Clause challenge. It has twice narrowed the rule in Flast v. 
Cohen, a late Warren Court case in which the Court held that taxpayer standing 
to bring Establishment Clause challenges was uniquely warranted because of 
the putatively singular injuries to conscience prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause.99 In Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, however, the Roberts 
Court in a plurality opinion held that Flast was limited to congressional 
expenditures explicitly authorized by statute and did not extend to general 
appropriations made to the executive branch.100 And in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the Roberts Court further circumscribed 
Flast, holding that Establishment Clause taxpayer standing is unavailable to 
challenge the granting of tax credits (as opposed to direct government 
expenditures).101 The Court may not yet have overruled Flast, but it has 
drastically narrowed and confined its reach.102 In combination with the 
legislative prayer decision, these standing decisions suggest that the Court is 
favoring narrow readings of the Establishment Clause103—as much or more a 
contraction at the justiciability stage as at the merits or remedies stages.104  
 
 99.  392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 100.  Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007).  
 101.  Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). Justice Scalia 
(joined by Justice Thomas) wrote separately urging that Flast should be overruled. Id. at 
1450 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 102.  For insightful discussion of the issue, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in 
the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1889-95 (2014) (discussing Flast and its 
“patricidal progeny”). 
 103.  Some scholars might perceive Hobby Lobby as narrowing the scope of the 
Establishment Clause as well, inasmuch as the Court rejected the argument that an 
exemption under RFRA would violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Frederick Mark 
Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby 
Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014); Micah 
Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing Off the Wall: What 
the New York Times and the Courts are Missing in the Birth Control Mandate Fight, SLATE 
(Nov. 26 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/ 
obamacare_birth_control_mandate_lawsuit_how_a_radical_argument_went_mainstream.ht
ml. I have argued that these scholars misread the doctrine and make erroneous claims about 
the types of exemptions prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See Marc O. DeGirolami 
On the Claim that Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate Violate the Establishment 
Clause, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/ 
mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment-
clause.html; DeGirolami, supra 36; see also Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby & Conestoga, et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Eugene Volokh, Would Granting an Exemption 
from the Employer Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-granting-exemption-employer-
mandate-violate-establishment-clause. If they are right, however, then Hobby Lobby would 
represent another narrowing of the scope of the Establishment Clause. 
 104.  Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: 
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing the expansion 
of standing doctrine to contract the ability of “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiffs to bring “structural 
lawsuits”). 
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Third, as discussed earlier, there is the notable absence of a single case 
striking down a law as violating the Establishment Clause in about a decade 
(excepting, depending on its basis, Hosanna-Tabor). One might argue that the 
substantive law of the Establishment Clause has thus remained in a kind of 
petrified state of confusion since 2005, the last time the Court struck down a 
local practice as violating the Establishment Clause with no single rationale 
gaining the assent of a majority of the Court.105 Indeed, the very least that can 
be said is that the Court’s older Establishment Clause tests—the Lemon test and 
the endorsement test—have neither been explicitly overruled nor explicitly 
ratified. Whatever indications there were that the Court might take its historical 
approach to legislative prayer and apply it to the Establishment Clause more 
generally have not borne fruit.106 
But another way of looking at the dearth of Establishment Clause cases in 
the Roberts Court’s first decade is precisely as a kind of contraction in 
coverage. That perspective depends upon perceiving the making of 
constitutional law as a distinctive type of common law process, in which a 
subsequent precedent on the same substantive topic not only explains or 
elucidates the reach of the prior case, but also reaffirms and re-entrenches the 
prior case as good law. The very process of revisiting and reaffirming prior 
cases—whether or not those earlier cases are extended to reach the facts of the 
current case—can itself strengthen the validity and vitality of those earlier 
cases.107 This is not always the case: sometimes when a court raises a 
precedent, it rejects it, distinguishes it, narrows it, or even reformulates it. But 
if the precedent is reaffirmed (even if it is not extended), it is often regularized 
and re-validated.  
Consider, for example, only a fragment of the Burger Court’s unusually 
ample Establishment Clause jurisprudence in 1985: in two cases, it reaffirmed 
and developed limits on government financial support for religious 
institutions;108 in a third, in only a few words it articulated an entirely new, 
confusing, and not particularly well-reasoned theory of Establishment Clause 
 
 105.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 
(2005).  
 106.  My own view is that this is regrettable, inasmuch as the historical approach has 
significant advantages over other alternatives. See generally DEGIROLAMI, supra note 39, 
chs. 7, 10. But the outright denial of certiorari in the Elmbrook School District litigation 
(rather than an order granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding the case 
for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s holding in Town of Greece) may suggest 
that the Court’s older Establishment Clause tests are not dead yet. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. 
Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a high school graduation held in a church 
violated the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2283 (2014). 
 107.  Reaffirmation of precedent fortifies precedent’s reliance function. See Randy J. 
Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 1843, 1855-57 (2013). But it can also signal the Court’s recommitment to that 
precedent in each new iteration of reaffirmation. 
 108.  Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373 (1985).  
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violations based on third-party harms;109 and in a fourth, it extended its school 
prayer cases to proscribe moments of silence as well.110 In each case, the 
Burger Court relied on, reclaimed, and revitalized the Lemon test, together with 
the tradition of expansive Establishment Clause doctrine that preceded it.111 
Each of these four cases further entrenched—and “familiar[ized]”112—the 
broad reading of the Establishment Clause. Or consider the legislative prayer 
cases: before Town of Greece, there had been no decision on the issue since 
1983, and while Marsh was still good law, the simple fact of the passage of 
thirty years without any word from the Supreme Court made Marsh’s 
continuing vitality less certain. Yet now, after its reaffirmation and re-
entrenchment in Town of Greece, Marsh has new strength and force, even as its 
scope may be limited to legislative prayer.  
The primary point is that over ten years the Roberts Court has not engaged 
in this process of precedential reaffirmation and re-entrenchment at all with 
respect to the Court’s broad Establishment Clause tests. If precedent has a 
“half-life,” and if the absence of precedential reaffirmation suggests something 
of judicial desuetude, then such reaffirmation will matter for the strength of the 
precedent. To the extent that the Roberts Court has explicitly moved 
Establishment Clause doctrine in any direction, it has contracted it in the 
doctrine of standing.  
And what of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby? The ferocity of opposition to the 
Court’s decision is so overpowering in some circles as perhaps to obscure that 
Hobby Lobby was not a constitutional case at all.113 As already noted, in the 
Free Exercise Clause context, the Court has shown solicitude for statutes such 
as RFRA and RLUIPA, which are creatures of the political branches, far more 
than for constitutional doctrine, which is not. True, Justice Alito suggested that 
RFRA gives more free exercise protection than what was available before 
Smith. But Hobby Lobby can and should be read as a straightforward exercise 
in statutory interpretation, not as a crypto-expansion of constitutional rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, possibly for reasons of constitutional 
avoidance, the majority in Hobby Lobby expressly declined to address the free 
exercise claims that were raised. And the narrowness of the Court’s 5-4 
holding—limited as it is to the rights of closely held corporations to exercise 
religion under RFRA and to the conclusion that, in this case, the government 
did not satisfy strict scrutiny where it was already employing a less restrictive 
 
 109.  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703. 
 110.  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 111.  Ball, 473 U.S. at 380; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 410; Caldor, 472 U.S. at 708; Jaffree, 
472 U.S. at 55-56. 
 112.  Ball, 473 U.S. at 380. 
 113.  Arguments associating Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), with Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), for example, make the regrettable category mistake of 
comparing statutory apples with constitutional oranges. 
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means in implementing its contraception mandate114—hardly indicates that 
Hobby Lobby represents a major expansion of religious free exercise at all, let 
alone constitutional free exercise. Nothing in Hobby Lobby contradicts the core 
thesis espoused here: that of contraction in constitutional coverage. 
Whether the Roberts Court’s contraction as to the coverage of the religion 
clauses, and its general preference for the narrow reading of the clauses, is a 
positive development will depend on one’s views about fundamental questions 
of constitutional interpretation. Contraction in the coverage of both clauses may 
suggest that on the issue of religious expression, for example, one might expect 
to see more government expression and less individual expression. In 
politically partisan terms, religious conservatives should expect more 
establishment and fewer free exercise cases with which to agree, while secular 
liberals should expect the reverse. That jurisprudential outcome would hardly 
represent an uncomplicated good for those who support religious freedom.  
Yet there is an underlying unity in the Roberts Court’s approach, an 
attention to the hydraulics of the First Amendment. In 1990, the Rehnquist 
Court opted for a narrow reading of the Free Exercise Clause, resulting in an 
unbalanced doctrinal state of affairs: a narrow Free Exercise Clause and a broad 
Establishment Clause. But if the Free Exercise Clause is interpreted narrowly, 
then the argument for reading the Establishment Clause narrowly grows 
stronger. If constitutional protection for religion is narrowed, then so, too, 
should constitutional prohibition with respect to religion. The clauses are a unit: 
together, they express an integrated and complementary position about the 
relationship of religion and government. The view of the current Court seems 
to be that if it retreats from the constitutional stage of protection, it should also 
withdraw from the constitutional arena of prohibition.115 The Roberts Court 
appears to be following just this course, gradually balancing the clauses and 
narrowing the more expansive and immoderate interpretations of the 
Establishment Clause that it inherited. 
 
 114.  The Hobby Lobby majority required Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which made a 
point of emphasizing that the government did have a compelling interest in its mandate and 
that the government was already using less restrictive means than what it offered Hobby 
Lobby. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“As the Court's opinion explains, the record in these cases shows that there is an existing, 
recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework to provide coverage. That 
framework is one that HHS has itself devised, that the plaintiffs have not criticized with a 
specific objection that has been considered in detail by the courts in this litigation, and that is 
less restrictive than the means challenged by the plaintiffs in these cases.”).  
 115.  Some may agree that the clauses should be read complementarily, but nevertheless 
disagree that they should both be read the same way. For example, some may resist the latter 
conclusion on the basis of a “broad principle of government non-endorsement” that applies 
across the Constitution. See Nelson Tebbe, Government Non-Endorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
650 (2013). Others may instead argue for complementary readings of the clauses that favor 
narrow establishment but broad free exercise protections. The claim here is merely that the 
Roberts Court’s approach is internally coherent and logical, not that it is necessary. 
2015] CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTION 409 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that in the Roberts Court’s first decade, its 
approach to the religion clauses is best described as contraction—as to judicial 
review, as to the range of voting patterns, and as to the substantive coverage of 
the clauses. A decade is not a long time at the Supreme Court and the vagaries 
of elections might well disturb or even reverse some or all of the trends 
discussed here. For the present, however, those who decry the Roberts Court’s 
“activism” should welcome its strikingly restrained religion clause 
jurisprudence (though they probably will not). And those who bemoan the 
modern Supreme Court’s aggressive jurisprudence of the religion clauses, 
inaugurated in 1947,116 developed and expanded in the 1960s, and steadily 
entrenched in the 1970s and 1980s, should approve of a Supreme Court that is 
more reticent than its predecessors to wield that power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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